Exposition
of Pratyaksa and Anumāna according to the Dignāga and Dharmakīrti
Pratyaksha (प्रत्यक्ष/
perception) literally means that which
is perceptible to the eye or visible, in general usage it refers to being
present, present before the eye i.e. within the range of sight, cognizable by
any sense organ, distinct, evident, clear, direct, immediate, explicit,
express, corporeal; it is a Pramana, mode of proof.
The master
logician Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya presents the definition of pratyakṣa
as thus: “pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham
nāmajātyādyasaṁyutam” i.e. pratyakṣa is that cognition which is free from
conceptual construction (kalpanā) that is from the association of name, class
character, genus etc. The term ‘kalpanāpoḍha’ means free from conceptual
construction which is definitely indicates the nirvikalpaka form of pratyakṣa;
which is considered by the Buddhist logicians as the only form of pratyakṣa.
According to them, it is only nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa which is real and
unerring. The pure particular is the 60 object (ālambana) of nirvikalpaka
pratyakṣa. The pure particular is called svalakṣaṇa that is grasped by us in
nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.
Dharmakīrti accepts Dignāga’s definition of pratyakṣa, but
adds another epithet ‘abhrānta’ (non erroneous) to it. So his definition
becomes: “tatra kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntaṁ pratyakṣam” i.e. pratyakṣa is that
cognition which is free from conceptual construction and which is
non-erroneous. The word ‘tatra’ indicates localization (saptamī-arthe), but it
is (moreover) used to indicate a selection. Thus the meaning of the sentence is
the following one. ‘Tatra’ here means among pratyakṣa and anumāna. Pratyakṣa is
here taken as subject and the characteristics of non-constructive and
non-erroneous are predicated to it. It is non- constructive and containing no
error. Dharmakīrti says, pratyakṣa as a presentation determined exclusively by
the object and free from all conceptual constructions (kalpanā). Obviously it
is nirvikalpaka knowledge, since savikalpaka knowledge involves the conceptual
activity of the mind. Dharmakīrti is of opinion that names and relations are
imposed by the mind, while the senses reveal the objects accurately unless they
are themselves perverted by organic or extraneous causes. This pure pratyakṣa,
free from all traces of conceptual activity, is said to give us the object in
its own nature (svalakṣaṇam).
Dharmaki̅rti recognizes sense perception or
sensation as the source of right knowledge. In the third chapter of the
Pramānavārtika and first chapter of Nyāya-bindu, he discusses perception as a source of
efficient knowledge which is without imagination and illusion. For him
sensation or sense perception arises out of the object of perception. It is an
effect of the object of perception. For him, there can be no perception without
object of perception and vice -versa. As mentioned above for Dharmaki̅rti
perception is described as a causal outcome. The presence of (all) the
conditions of cognitions of consists in the presence of an individual entity
and the totality of all other conditions of cognition. In his philosophy real
cognition is a self complete process which produces self-consciousness in the
mind of that individual. So, in his philosophy there are some significant
characteristics of perception,
1) Perception according to Dharmaki̅rti is direct sense
perception, which possesses efficiency.
2) Perception is the totally. It is different from productive
imagination and can be justified by introspection.
3) Direct knowledge means here neither construction
(judgement) nor illusion.
4) Perception in Dharmaki̅rti‟s philosophy is has
characteristic of conciliation of the object of indirect knowledge.
5) Dharmaki̅rti does not exclude consciousness while
explaining direct cognition or perception.
Dignāga’s
definition of Anumāna:
Anumāna (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumāna. Anumāna (inference or reasoning) for Dignāga is a type of cognition which is only aware of general attributes, and is constructed out of simpler sensations. Inference can also be communicated through linguistic conventions.
A
central issue which concerned Dignāga was the interpretation of signs (linga)
or the evidence (hetu) which led one to an inference (anumana)
about states of affairs; such as how smoke can lead one to infer that there is
a fire. This topic of svārthānumāna (reasoning, literally
"inference for oneself") is the subject of chapter two of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya
while the topic of the third chapter is about demonstration (parārthānumāna,
literally "inference for others"), that is, how one communicates
one's inferences through proper argument.
According
to Richard Hayes, in Dignāga's system, to obtain knowledge that a property (the
"inferable property", sadhya) is inherent in a
"subject of inference" (paksa) it must be derived through an
inferential sign (linga). For this to occur, the following must be true:
- The inferential
sign must be a property of the subject of the inference. That is, there
exists in the subject of inference a property, which is different from the
inferable property and which is furthermore evident to the person drawing
the inference; this second property may serve as an inferential sign in
case it has two further characteristics.
- The inferential
sign must be known to occur in at least one locus, other than the subject
of inference, in which the inferable property occurs.
- The inferential
sign must not be known to occur in any other loci in
which the inferable property is absent.
In
the philosophy of Dharmaki̅rti, inference is twofold. They are inference for
oneself (svārthnūmāna) and inference for others (parārthanūmāna). The first
type of inference is internal and the later is verbal. In both of the cases the
three aspects of logical marks are to be fulfilled. They are correspondence to
the minor premise (pakṣadharmatva), to the major premise (anvaya) and to the
contraposition of the major premise. In other words, firstly in order to be a
valid inference the object cognized by inference must be present. Secondly it
also must be present in all similar instances. Thirdly there must be an
absolute absence of the object inferred in all dissimilar or negative cases. He
discusses these two types of inference separately in detail in his
philosophical works. The distinction between a source of cognition and its
result is here just the same as in the case of perception. The usually cited
example of direct knowledge in the philosophy of Dharmaki̅rti is of cognition
of blue colour. Again, in case of inference the usually cited example is,
wherever there is smoke there is also fire. There is smoke in that place.
Therefore, there is fire. Here, in the case of perception an individual at
first senses or cognizes the object immediately. Following by this
sense-cognition, a mental sensation arises out of the same cause. In the third
phase cooperation of the object of cognition and the immediately followed proper
object of cognition is taken place. Dharmaki̅rti states about three phases in
case of inference also. A cognition which is produced (indirectly) through a
mark that has a threefold aspect, and which refers to an object, (not
perceived, but) inferred – is internal inference. Inference taken place here
regarding the object or the predicate can be either negation or identity or
causation.